This question asks us for a goal of Dworkin's legal theory. Dworkin's theory is expounded upon in the third paragraph of the passage. It basically talks about a theory that differs from legal positivism by advocating a legal fact of the matter in the absence of a consensus, and also differs from natural law theory by not allowing judges to be "free to impose their own morality at will, without regard to the internal logic of laws." (lines 42-44)
(A) No, Dworkin is advocating a legal theory that is distinct from both natural law and legal positivism. The goal of his theory is not to evaluate interpretations of laws performed by legal positivist judges.
(B) "social consensus playing any role in legal interpretation." This could be considered a characteristic of Dworkin's legal theory, even though it is a bit too extreme, but it is not the "goal" of Dworkin's legal theory. Dworkin talks about how an interpretation may be correct even if no consensus is reached. Get rid of this answer choice.
(C) "argument against the use of moral intuition" Dworkin allow for the possibility that moral intuition can play a role in arriving at an interpretation, but that judges are not to let their personal morality run rampant in interpretation without regard to the internal logic of the the law.
(D) "must be based on the principles of the original authors of the laws" Actually a characteristic of Dworkin's theory is that it leaves room for the possibility of "improving upon the interpretations . . . of the original authors." There is also no mention of Dworkin setting out a goal of legal decisions having to be based on the principles of orginal authors. In fact, the only concrete principle Dworkin really advocates is basing interpretation on the "internal logic of society's laws and the general principles they embody." (lines 35-37) At the same time he criticizes sole reliance on moral intuition or sole reliance on consensus.
(E) This is definitely the goal of Dworkin's theory. In lines 26-34 Dworkin talks about how legal positivism is incompatible with the actual work of lawyers and judges, and that Dworkin seeks to validate this practice (of acting as if there is a fact of the matter even in cases where there is no consensus) without falling into the error of natural law theory. Winner.