Q20 - When the Pinecrest Animal Shelter

[cyruswhittaker]

Can you explain #20? The question places the condition "and the least restriction" but the correct answer, B, seems to me to be very restrictive on the directors.

[giladedelman]

Thank you for the question! This is an interesting problem.

So, we're told that the Pinecrest directors put out a request for money to make specific repairs. Since more money was donated than was needed for the repairs, they want to donate the surplus to other shelters. But the author argues that they should get the donors' permission first.

We're asked to select the principle that justifies this reasoning -- i.e., an assumption -- while placing the least restrictions on the directors. This sounds confusing, but basically what this added instruction means is that we're being asked to find something closer to a necessary assumption, rather than a sufficient one that goes further than what is needed to make the argument.

So what is the assumption here? Most simply put, it's that if people donate money for a particular cause and you end up with extra, you should get their permission before donating that extra money to another cause.

(B) is correct because it articulates this assumption without going further. "If that becomes impossible" matches up with the fact that Pinecrest received more money than it could spend on the repairs, while "express wishes of the donors" matches up with getting their permission first. So, if it becomes impossible to spend the donated money on the original cause, you should dispose of the leftover money according to the wishes of the donors. Sounds good!

Now let's look at the incorrect answers.

(A) goes too far. If this were true, then the directors wouldn't be able to donate the surplus funds to other causes even if they got the donors' permission.

(C) also goes too far. If this principle were true, then the directors would have to give all the extra money back, so again, irrespective of the donors' wishes, they wouldn't be able to donate the surplus funds to other shelters.

(D) is pretty tempting, but it's actually out of scope. The argument is about what happens when people donate money for a specific cause, and then there's surplus money left over. This answer doesn't address either of these conditions, so it's way too broad.

(E) goes too far, but in the opposite direction from what we've seen. If this principle were true, then the directors wouldn't have to ask the donors' permission before spending the money, so the argument would fall apart.

Does this problem make sense to you now? Let me know if you have any more questions.

[goriano]

Thank you for the question! This is an interesting problem.

So, we're told that the Pinecrest directors put out a request for money to make specific repairs. Since more money was donated than was needed for the repairs, they want to donate the surplus to other shelters. But the author argues that they should get the donors' permission first.

We're asked to select the principle that justifies this reasoning -- i.e., an assumption -- while placing the least restrictions on the directors. This sounds confusing, but basically what this added instruction means is that we're being asked to find something closer to a necessary assumption, rather than a sufficient one that goes further than what is needed to make the argument.

So what is the assumption here? Most simply put, it's that if people donate money for a particular cause and you end up with extra, you should get their permission before donating that extra money to another cause.

(B) is correct because it articulates this assumption without going further. "If that becomes impossible" matches up with the fact that Pinecrest received more money than it could spend on the repairs, while "express wishes of the donors" matches up with getting their permission first. So, if it becomes impossible to spend the donated money on the original cause, you should dispose of the leftover money according to the wishes of the donors. Sounds good!

Now let's look at the incorrect answers.

(A) goes too far. If this were true, then the directors wouldn't be able to donate the surplus funds to other causes even if they got the donors' permission.

(C) also goes too far. If this principle were true, then the directors would have to give all the extra money back, so again, irrespective of the donors' wishes, they wouldn't be able to donate the surplus funds to other shelters.

(D) is pretty tempting, but it's actually out of scope. The argument is about what happens when people donate money for a specific cause, and then there's surplus money left over. This answer doesn't address either of these conditions, so it's way too broad.

(E) goes too far, but in the opposite direction from what we've seen. If this principle were true, then the directors wouldn't have to ask the donors' permission before spending the money, so the argument would fall apart.

Does this problem make sense to you now? Let me know if you have any more questions.

I'm still not getting (B). Specifically, I'm not getting the part about "should dispose of the funds according to the express wishes of the donors." It seems like this condition would still be too restrictive because it overrides the point of the directors' asking for permission, since the decision is ultimately up to the donors. For example, if the express wishes of the donors were to have the surplus be used toward funding the local weight watchers organization, no amount of pleading/convincing/asking for permission on the part of the directors would have any effect on allowing the directors to use that extra money for other animal shelters.

[timmydoeslsat]

I'm still not getting (B). Specifically, I'm not getting the part about "should dispose of the funds according to the express wishes of the donors." It seems like this condition would still be too restrictive because it overrides the point of the directors' asking for permission, since the decision is ultimately up to the donors. For example, if the express wishes of the donors were to have the surplus be used toward funding the local weight watchers organization, no amount of pleading/convincing/asking for permission on the part of the directors would have any effect on allowing the directors to use that extra money for other animal shelters.

But you can also interpret this answer choice as meaning that the directors would ask these donators if it is ok to allocate the extra donation dollars available to other animal shelters. The donators could then say yes this is my wish.

This answer choice is not restrictive. It says that it does come down to the decision of the donator, but that is what the conclusion calls for as well when it states to obtain permission first.

[sumukh09]

For B) the part about it becoming impossible to spend money on that cause threw me off. I didn't really like the idea of "public funds becoming impossible to donate towards that cause" to mean "the cause was sufficiently looked after but there was more money than needed." In other words, it wasn't impossible at all - it was proven to be more than possible.

Other than that I can see why B) would be correct.

[katl]

Can someone explain what D means in laymen terms? Does D justify the conclusion that directors should obtain permission? Or is D saying that directors (or some other agent), but not the donors, that have the authority to decide how to use the funds?

Thanks!

[tommywallach]

(D): People who give money to charity can't force the directors to choose which places to give the money to.

Honestly, that's all it says. Lots of words to get there though!

-t

[WaltGrace1983]

I am a little confused on (A) and (B). I chose (B) but during review (A) kept looking better and better.

My thought process was this:

"If directors of charitable organizations cannot allocate these funds to any purposes not specifically earmarked, wouldn't it make sense that this would require that the directors ask permission?" In a principle question like this, would the truth of (A)'s principle mean that regardless of getting permission from the donors the directors CANNOT do anything else with the money regardless?

The thing that got me tripped up with (B) was the "express wishes of the donors." Asking to donate to other animal shelters may not constitute the "express wishes of donors." Maybe the donors want to donate the money to a different charity after they found out that the extra money was not needed.

[ohthatpatrick]

You are correct.

If (A)'s principle holds, then the directors can ONLY use the money for repairs, because that was the only purpose specifically earmarked in advance.

Even if the directors went to the donors and said, "Hey, everyone, we have surplus money ... is it cool with you if we donate this elsewhere?" and even if the donors said, "Totally", the rule in (A) says that this is not allowed.

Meanwhile the rule in (B) would allow for the surplus to be donated elsewhere as long as the donors said, "Yes, that's what we want."

A lot of people understandably have issues with (B), since the wording is not designed to perfectly lock in with the stimulus.

This question stem is crazy weird, so as we analyze each answer choice, we have to ask ourselves two questions:
1. Does this answer choice give me a rule that requires the directors to ask for the donors' permission before doing something else with the surplus funds?
2. Is this answer choice more/less restrictive than any other answer choice that satisfied #1?

Answer choices (A), (B), (C) say that the directors are NOT allowed to just donate the extra money however they choose.

(E) actually DOES say this and (D) doesn't directly address it (it doesn't deal with whether directors have this power - it only deals with whether donors are allowed to delegate that power to directors).

So (E) and (D) don't pass #1 at all.

In reality, (A) and (C) don't pass #1 either, if we're saying, "Does this rule force the directors to get permission before using excess funds for something else?"

(A) makes getting permission a moot point, because it ONLY allows funds to be used for the original purpose.

(C) makes getting permission a moot point, because it REQUIRES that all excess funds be returned.

So (B) is really the only answer choice that qualifies for #1, a rule that forces the directors to get permission from the donors.

Hope this helps.

[eve.lederman]

My reasoning for E is that the stem asks us for the principle that places the least restriction. E seems to place little restriction because the directors don't have to ask for permission. They can just do with it as they want. How is that not justifying the least restrictive part of the stem?

[christine.defenbaugh]

Thanks for posting, eve.lederman!

You'd be spot on if the question was asking us only to find the answer choice that was the least restrictive!

But pay careful attention to the task that we've been given in the question stem: we need to find a principle that justifies the position advocated above and YET is least restrictive. Take a moment and consider what "the position advocated above" really is.

That's the conclusion of the argument! And that conclusion is that the directors should obtain permission before running off with the money.

(E) is certainly the least restrictive! In fact, it's not restrictive at all. It does not justify the conclusion of the argument. If (E) were valid, the directors would not need to ask permission at all!

It's critical to understand your task completely before working through the answer choices. Here, our task is twofold: justify the conclusion, and do it in the least restrictive way possible. (E) fails the first part of our task.

Does that help clear things up a bit?

[513852276]

(E) actually DOES say this and (D) doesn't directly address it (it doesn't deal with whether directors have this power - it only deals with whether donors are allowed to delegate that power to directors).

So (E) and (D) don't pass #1 at all.

However, since the donors cannot delegate directors the responsibility of allocating funds, it justify directors' action to ask permission from donors. Actually I think D is wrong because it is more restrict. In B, directors may just need to ask donors' permission for excessive funds for specific purpose, but in D, directors may need to ask permission for every funds raised, either for general or specific purpose.