Q18

[JoyC484]

Can anyone please explain why (D) is right? I can see how passage B supports it, but I cannot find any line in passage A implies it!

[ohthatpatrick]

The support in psg A is definitely more "shadow-y".

First, the author acknowledges that some legal theorists reject a judicial candor requirement, based on a judge's need to balance a myriad of institutional considerations. A rigid adherence to candor could be "dangerously" utopian.

So these theorists definitely think that sometimes candor could be dangerous or that sometimes being somewhat disingenuous might be the better way to balance all the relevant considerations.

Even though this isn't the author's thinking, we're only trying to support the weak claim that being insincere COULD conceivably be positive at least once.

Another place we could point is line 12-14. The author says,
"IF it can be shown that candor produces the most prudential outcomes"

This acknowledges the possibility that candor might now always produce the most prudential outcomes (or at least that it would be difficult to prove that idea).

The final place is the 3rd paragraph of psg. A, in which the author is saying, "We should be prepared to defend judicial candor on moral grounds, regardless of whether candor produces good outcomes."

Again, within this logic, is the implicit acknowledgment that judicial candor might not necessarily always be the BEST course of action, in terms of outcomes, but it is still a course of action we could argue is REQUIRED based on moral reasons.

(A) neither author would say "unshakable"

(B) When psg A talks about guiding future litigants, it's actually couched in wording that says this is something that "proponents" would argue, not necessarily the author..

And when psg B talks about 'precedents' in line 43-48, maybe we could stretch an inference that "if precedents count for little when judges are insincere, then precedents provide insufficient guidance when judges are insincere?"

But that's a pretty speculative jump we're making, and since we've got nothing from psg A (just from proponents), this answer is weakly supported.


(C) "unavoidable" is way too strong.

(E) I don't think either author fully backs this claim, but there's definitely nothing in psg A about eventually detecting a lack of candor.

[AviS649]

The support in psg A is definitely more "shadow-y".


(B) both authors would probably disagree with this ... they think that candor helps guide litigants (you gotta be able to trust the judge's authentic reasoning in order to lean on precedent and think it will play out the same way)

Hey Patrick, could you elaborate on this more please? The question asks about an agreement over what lack of candor entails, and answer B says that it would provide INSUFFICIENT guidance to litigants. I felt that this was pretty supported by 55-59 and 17-20.

[JoannaZ901]

I felt the same as the former post. Could somebody help us out? What exactly makes (D) better than (B)??? Many thanks!

[Yu440]

(B) both authors would probably disagree with this ... they think that candor helps guide litigants (you gotta be able to trust the judge's authentic reasoning in order to lean on precedent and think it will play out the same way)

If both authors think that candor helps guide litigants (line 17), doesn't it imply that a lack of candor will misguide litigants? Or at least provide them with insufficient guidance? Or is this mistaken negation

Is B wrong because psg B doesn't really mention litigants?

[ohthatpatrick]

Ah, thanks for finding this error. I’ll go back and edit the original to prevent confusion.

Yes, I was upside down. Both authors would probably agree to this, but we don’t have strong textual support from either passage.

When psg A talks about guiding future litigants, it's actually couched in wording that says this is something that "proponents" would argue, not necessarily the author..

And when psg B talks about 'precedents' in line 43-48, maybe we could stretch an inference that "if precedents count for little when judges are insincere, then precedents provide insufficient guidance when judges are insincere?"

But that's a pretty speculative jump we're making, and since we've got nothing from psg A (just from proponents), this answer is weakly supported.