by ohthatpatrick Wed Nov 22, 2017 3:07 pm
I won't rehash all the stuff said in Q20's thread, but both passages address the question of, "Should judges be candid in their reasoning?"
Psg A - Yes (lines 21-24), "judges should not lie or deliberately mislead in their opinions".
Psg B - Usually yes (last line), "there should be a strong presumption in favor of candor."
Psg B leaves some daylight, though, for exceptions. After making her 2nd paragraph's case in favor of candor, she says in her 3rd paragraph "Have I just demonstrated an UNSHAKABLE obligation? Probably not."
She implies that "judicial deception MAY sometimes be warranted in cases where it yields some net benefit".
Psg A would endorse (C), since she is saying we should be defending judicial candor on the basis of moral considerations, regardless of whether they produce good outcomes.
Psg B meanwhile, mainly justified judicial candor based on the bad outcomes we would have if we lost it (less able to constrain judges / to criticize them / to condemn them ... and public cynicism would increase).
Psg B is justifying the presumption in favor of judicial candor on the basis of its good outcomes (judicial accountability and public trust), and it's also justfying possible exceptions to judicial candor on the basis of good outcomes "when it yields some net benefit")
tl;dr version
Psg A - judicial candor is always required, regardless of whether it leads to good outcomes
Psg B - we should heavily lean towards judicial candor, since not having it would lead to bad outcomes, but it's possible there are times where we would make an exception and allow judicial deception if it produced an important net gain.